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CRYSTAL CLEAR VAGUENESS: THE BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION HAMPERS JUSTICE WITH ITS
VAGUE “PROCESS OF JUSTICE”
By Maria Natera+
Immigration and deportation were the topics du jour in the last presidential
election.1 Under the new administration, the number of immigration arrests and
deportations have skyrocketed from the past administration, which also oversaw
a notable increase in such proceedings.2 In an area of law that can have such
drastic repercussions to the constitutional tenants of life and liberty, it is one that
“lacks some of the most basic due process protections and checks and balances
that we take for granted in our American system of justice.”3
Due Process is a fundamental right that is enshrined within the United States
Constitution.4 Every individual that falls under the jurisdiction of the United
States is entitled to both procedural and substantive due process protections.5
Those protections have developed in American jurisprudence since the creation
of the nation. One legal protection in this category holds that if a statute does
not allow a person of reasonable intelligence to understand what he is and is not
legally entitled to do, then that statute should be struck down for being
unconstitutionally vague and reworked so that it fits a reasonableness standard.6
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1. Dan Nowicki, Immigration at Front of 2016 Presidential Race, USA TODAY (May 15,
2015, 9:39 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2015/05/15/immigration
-2016-presidential-race/27360717/.
2. Maria Sacchetti, Immigration Arrests Soar under Trump; Sharpest Spike Seen for
Noncriminals, WASH. POST (May 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigrationarrests-up-during-trump/2017/05/17/74399a04-3b12-11e7-9e48c4f199710b69_story.html?utm_term=.fab588d9919d.
3. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ENSURING FAIRNESS AND DUE PROCESS IN
IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 1, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/
priorities/immigration/2008dec_immigration.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“But once an alien enters the country, the
legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
permanent.”).
6. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] statute which either forbids
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning . . . violates the first essential of due process of law.”).
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In the area of immigration law, the issue of unconstitutional vagueness has
become more prominent in recent years,7 with the United States Supreme Court
striking down as unconstitutional an immigration statute under the void-forvagueness doctrine.8 The Immigration and Nationality Act provides definitions
for certain crimes that are grounds for legal immigrants to be placed in removal
proceedings, with the possibility of deportation.9 With such severe potential
consequences, it is crucial that the statutes be crystal clear on what every crime
entails in order to give immigrants fair warning, a touchstone of the due process
protections in this area.10
One such crime that may subject an immigrant to removal proceedings and
deportation is a conviction for an “aggravated felony,” coupled with a sentence
of more than one year imprisonment.11 The definition of the crime includes,
among other things, any offense involving “obstruction of justice.”12 Over the
years the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which is generally the final
arbiter and enforcer of immigration laws and oversees all appeals regarding
removal proceedings,13 has created several different definitions of what crimes
constitute “obstruction of justice.”14 This comment will analyze these varying
definitions, and discuss how they can be used to improve upon the most recent
“obstruction of justice” definition provided by the BIA.
Most recently, in Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, the BIA defined “obstruction
of justice” as any “specific intent to interfere with the process of justice,” and as
such, no requirement of an ongoing criminal proceeding or investigation is
needed.15 The BIA did not fully define what “process of justice” entails.16 The
Ninth Circuit correctly held that this definition was unconstitutionally vague,
and if it had been allowed to stand, could potentially allow almost any specific
intent crime to be included under this category.17 However, the Ninth Circuit

7. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 2016 WIS.
L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2016) (discussing recent immigration cases dealing with unconstitutional
vagueness issues).
8. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2017).
9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012).
10. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (stating that vague laws have
the ability to trap innocent people when a fair warning is not provided).
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (An “alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony
at any time after admission is deportable.”).
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S).
13. Exec. Office of Immigration Reform, Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
14. See Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 813–14 (9th Cir. 2016)
(comparing the BIA’s prior interpretations of “obstruction of justice” with its most recent).
15. Id. at 812.
16. Id. at 819.
17. Id. at 822.
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remanded the case, and instructed the BIA to attempt to rework the definition,
providing no additional guidance as to what the definition should be.18
Part I of this comment explains the relevant background of the void-for
vagueness doctrine. It delves into the historical use of the doctrine in Supreme
Court cases involving convictions of criminal law statutes in combination with
civil immigration provisions that can lead to removal and deportation
proceedings, as well as its modern-day challenges. Additionally, Part I discusses
Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, and the various definitions of “obstruction of
justice” the BIA has created over time. Finally, Part I discusses the Sessions v.
Dimaya decision, which was recently decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States, and its potential effects on the void-for-vagueness doctrine in this
area of law. Part II compares the past “obstruction of justice” definitions, with
the most current one discussed in Valenzuela Gallardo, explains the possible
ramifications of allowing the current definition to stand, and discusses the
heightened need to protect due process requirements for non-citizens.
Finally, Part III argues that the BIA should in fact include a temporal nexus
requirement to the definition of “obstruction of justice,” in order to eliminate
any unconstitutional vagueness issues. While the Ninth Circuit refrained from
holding that the BIA should include such a nexus,19 the requirement would be in
line with the definition of obstruction of justice crimes found in standard
criminal law.20 Additionally, it would help resolve the issue of vagueness, by
narrowing the scope of crimes included. This, in turn, would provide necessary
constitutional notice and satisfy the due process constitutional protection
afforded to every person in the United States. This Comment concludes that
when dealing with non-citizens, who are generally under-protected within the
law, the Constitution demands the most rigorous application of constitutional
safeguards, and as such, the “obstruction of justice” definition is especially
lacking.
I. CRIMINAL IMMIGRATION LAW’S VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS PROBLEM
A. Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court famously noted:

18. Id. at 824.
19. Id. at 822.
20. Obstruction of Justice, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012). Obstruction of
Justice is defined as:
[A] broad term for conduct that interferes with any aspect of the system of justice,
including any act that interferes with or endeavors to interfere with: an investigation,
prosecution, administrative process, or trial; the police, agencies, prosecutors, or courts;
their personnel or offices; or the witnesses, parties, or evidence that may be relevant to
such proceedings.
Id.
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Vagueness doctrine is an outgrowth…of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. A conviction fails to comport with due process
if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory
enforcement.21
For more than 125 years, the Supreme Court has stricken criminal statutes as
being unconstitutionally vague,22 and over that time, the doctrine has come to be
considered “among the most important guarantees of liberty under the law.”23
The doctrine itself can be implicated for one of two reasons.24 The first deals
with notice, a requirement of the Due Process Clause.25 A criminal statute will
be held unconstitutionally vague “if it fails to provide people of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits.”26
This gives people the ability to adjust their behavior in order to conform to the
requirements as set out in the law. 27 As such, a criminal statute should be
unambiguous, as “[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to
speculate as to the meaning.”28 It should provide “relatively clear guidelines”29
that outline what conduct is prohibited, and set forth “objective criteria” 30 to
assess whether the statute has been violated.
The second reason that a criminal statute may be held unconstitutionally
vague is “if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.”31 The concern with such a statute is that it would impermissibly
delegate basic policy matters to law enforcement, judges, and juries on a
subjective basis, resulting in possible arbitrary and discriminatory application.32
Thus, a statute must “provide explicit standards for those who apply them”33 in
order to avoid an unconstitutional vagueness issue.

21. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 732 (2000)).
22. Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited,
30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 280 (2003).
23. Id. (quoting CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 102
(1996)).
24. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732 (discussing that a statute may be impermissibly vague if, first, people
of normal intelligence cannot understand the conduct it prohibits and, second, if it allows for
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement).
25. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979).
26. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732 (citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56–57 (1999)).
27. Morales, 527 U.S. at 58 (discussing the purpose of the fair notice requirement).
28. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
29. Posters ‘N’ Things v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525 (1994).
30. Id. at 526.
31. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732 (citing Morales, 527 U.S. at 56–57).
32. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972).
33. Id. at 108.
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B. Going Up: Supreme Court Tackles Possible Vagueness Issues in
Immigration Law
The Supreme Court has unequivocally held that any foreign national within
the jurisdiction of the United States is entitled to the protections of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment.34 However, it has yet
to strike down an immigration provision, using the void-for-vagueness analysis
discussed above, in connection with a removal proceeding.35 Despite this fact,
in recent years, the use of the void-for-vagueness doctrine has skyrocketed in
the intersection of criminal law and immigration law.36 However, this is not the
first time the doctrine has appeared in that context, as the Supreme Court
addressed this concern twice before.37 Most recently, the Court decided a case
that upheld a constitutional challenge on the basis of vagueness to an
immigration provision, causing the provision to be struck down.38
1. Emergence of Vagueness in Immigration Case Law
The earliest case that dealt with the possibility of unconstitutional vagueness
in a federal immigration statute was the Supreme Court’s 1951 decision in
Jordan v. De George.39 In that case, the Court analyzed a statute declaring an
Italian immigrant potentially deportable for a conviction of a “crime involving
moral turpitude.”40 De George had been previously convicted of conspiracy to
defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits on two separate occasions.41
He was placed in removal proceedings while serving his second sentence. 42
Despite the fact that neither party actually raised nor argued the issue of
vagueness, 43 and despite the fact that the statute itself was an immigration
34. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (“[A]ll persons within the
territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by [the Fifth and Sixth]
amendments, and that even aliens shall not…be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.”).
35. See Kara Goad & Elizabeth Sullivan, Supreme Court Bulletin: Sessions
v. Dimaya, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/15-1498 (last visited Mar.
17, 2019). Since removal proceedings are generally considered to be civil penalties, there has been
some discussion as to whether the same void-for-vagueness analysis used in criminal proceedings,
as protected by the Fifth Amendment, applies in civil cases as well. In Sessions v. Dimaya, the
Supreme Court ended such discussion by affirming that the void-for vagueness analysis applies to
removal proceedings in the same way it applies to any other proceeding. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138
S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
36. Koh, supra note 7, at 1128.
37. See discussion infra Part B.1.
38. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1223 (striking down a statutory clause that “produces more
unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates”).
39. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (discussing whether a fraud conspiracy
against the United States is a crime involving moral turpitude under the Immigration Act of 1917).
40. Id. at 224–26.
41. Id. at 226.
42. Id. at 225.
43. Id. at 228.
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provision rather than a criminal statute,44 the Supreme Court, sua sponte, went
through the two-step analysis of the vagueness doctrine.45 The Court found that
the two-step test was satisfied, and that the statute at issue was not
unconstitutionally vague.46
In 1967, the Supreme Court heard Boutilier v. INS, its second case dealing
with vagueness in the immigration law context.47 The provision at issue in that
case prohibited entry into the United States to individuals “afflicted with
psychopathic personality.”48 At the time, homosexuals were considered to be
afflicted with psychopathic personality.49 Since the petitioner had previously
engaged in “homosexual relations,” 50 he was deemed to be afflicted with a
“psychopathic personality” and as a result, was subsequently deported. 51 A
challenge to the statute was then raised, alleging that the term “psychopathic
personality” was unconstitutionally vague.52 The challenge was subsequently
struck down, with the Court finding that the legislative history made it explicitly
clear that homosexual relations were included in the phrase “psychopathic
personality.”53
2. Modern Day Vagueness in Immigration Case Law
The Supreme Court’s denial of the vagueness challenges to the immigration
statutes in both cases remained the standard for many years.54 However, a recent
Supreme Court case involving the vagueness doctrine outside of the immigration
law context paved the way for a wider acceptance of immigration provisions
44. Id. at 231.
45. Id. at 231–32. The analysis itself involved determining “whether the language conveys
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practices.” Id. See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)
(stating that statutes that define terms “so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the . . . due process [clause]).
46. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 232.
47. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (addressing the case of an alien who was
deported on the basis of his homosexuality under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 120 (noting the “Public Health Service issued a certificate” that the petitioner
had a psychopathic personality and was a “sexual deviate at the time of his admission”).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 118.
52. Id. at 123.
53. Id. at 120 (explaining that “[t]he legislative history of the Act indicates beyond a shadow
of a doubt that the Congress intended the phrase ‘psychopathic personality’ to include
homosexuals.”).
54. Id. at 122 (finding that “Congress used the phrase ‘psychopathic personality’ not in
the clinical sense, but to effectuate its purpose to exclude from entry all homosexuals and other sex
perverts.”); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (holding that “[w]hatever else the
phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it
plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral
turpitude.”).
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being found to be unconstitutionally vague. In that case, Johnson v. United
States, the Court assessed the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “residual clause”
for vagueness.55
The Act itself included a definition of “violent felony,” that listed several
offenses.56 If a person were convicted of any of the listed offenses three or more
times, the Act would automatically increase a person’s prison term to a
minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life.57 The “residual clause” included
in the category of “violent felony,” any crime that “otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”58
Through its analysis of the residual clause, the Supreme Court held it was
unconstitutionally vague. 59 The Court found that there were two specific
features of the residual clause that made it unconstitutionally vague.60 First, it
was found that the residual clause left “grave uncertainty about how to estimate
the risk posed by a crime.”61 The second issue the Court had with the residual
clause was that it left uncertainty regarding the amount of risk it would take for
the crime to qualify as a violent felony.62 As the Supreme Court noted, “[b]y
combining indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime with
indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent
felony, the residual clause produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than
the Due Process Clause tolerates.”63
In its holding the Court broadened the doctrine of void-for-vagueness, stating
that in contradiction to prior narrow holdings by the Supreme Court, “a vague
provision is [not] constitutional merely because there is some conduct that
clearly falls within the provision’s grasp.”64 The holding provided an opening
for courts throughout the nation to more readily accept the void-for-vagueness
doctrine as a successful challenge within the criminal and immigration law
cross-section, which was used in a recent Supreme Court case.65

55. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
56. Id. at 2555–56. Other offenses included “burglary, arson, [] extortion, [or crimes]
involv[ing the] use of explosives.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
57. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555.
58. Id. at 2555–56 (quoting § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
59. Id. at 2557. The Supreme Court stated that the “residual clause leaves uncertainty about
how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.” Id. at 2558.
60. Id. at 2557.
61. Id.
62. Id. 2557–58.
63. Id. at 2558.
64. Id. at 2560–61. “It is one thing to apply an imprecise ’serious potential risk’ standard to
real-world facts; it is quite another to apply it to a judge-imagined abstraction.” Id. at 2558.
65. Koh, supra note 7, at 1152–53 (commenting that “[b]y broadening the scope of the
vagueness doctrine, Johnson provides an impetus for courts to reconsider how void for vagueness
challenges should fair in the immigration context.”).
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Sessions v. Dimaya66 presented the Supreme Court its first case in over fifty
years that dealt with the intersection of immigration provisions and the void-forvagueness doctrine. In it, the Supreme Court used the Johnson decision to strike
down an immigration provision using the doctrine of void-for-vagueness.67 In
Dimaya, the petitioner sought review as a result of his conviction of a “crime of
violence,”68 which triggered his eligibility for removal proceedings.69 Dimaya
had previously been convicted of first-degree residential burglary on two
separate occasions.70 He claimed that the crime of burglary did not fall under
the category of “crime of violence,” and that the statute should be struck down
for being unconstitutionally vague.71
Citing the Johnson decision, and using the vagueness doctrine analysis, the
Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit and held that the statute at hand
was in fact unconstitutionally vague and struck it down.72 The Court reasoned
that the “substantial risk” element found in the definition of “crime of violence”
was too indeterminate to give proper notice as to how much risk was substantial
enough to constitute such a crime.73 However, the Court explained that the issue
with the “substantial risk” element alone would not render the statute
unconstitutional.74 It also pointed out that, as in Johnson, the statute itself did
not offer any parameters as to what an “ordinary case” that violated the statue
would look like.75 Those two factors combined resulted in the residual clause
of the statute in Dimaya to be deemed unconstitutional under the void-forvagueness doctrine.76
As a result of the decision in Dimaya, courts now have a clearer path to finding
immigration statutes unconstitutionally vague.77 Given the increased attention

66. See generally Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (addressing the immigration
status of a permanent United States resident who had been convicted of burglary).
67. Id. at 1223.
68. Id. at 1211. The “crime of violence” definition is found in immigration provision 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F); it is one of a long list of crimes under the “aggravated felony” category. Id.
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2012)).
69. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1210–11. It triggers deportation removal proceedings for a noncitizen if they are also sentenced for a term of imprisonment of more than one year. 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
70. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1211.
71. Id. at 1211–12.
72. Id. at 1223.
73. Id. at 1214–15. The section of the definition for “crime of violence” at issue is as follows:
“(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.” Id. at 1211 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012) which defines “crime of violence”).
74. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1215.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1216, 1223.
77. See id. at 1223 (comparing an immigration statute from the instant case to a criminal
statute which required mandatory minimum prison sentences and was determined to be
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to immigration and deportation issues, as well as the increase in deportation
rates, the case is sure to have a significant impact on the criminal and
immigration law landscape and beyond.
C. Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch: Unconstitutional Vagueness and
Immigration Collide
1. Facts and Procedural History
Another case from the Ninth Circuit involving a vagueness challenge to an
immigration provision is Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch.78 Valenzuela Gallardo,
a citizen of Mexico, was granted lawful permanent residency to the United States
in 2002. 79 He was arrested and charged in California on several counts in
November 2007, but all charges were dismissed except for one count of
accessory to a felony, to which he pled guilty. 80 Valenzuela Gallardo was
initially placed on probation but later violated its terms, and as a result, was
given a sixteen-month prison sentence.81
As a result of the conviction and prison sentence, Valenzuela Gallardo was
placed in removal proceedings in June 2010.82 The proceedings were initiated
because the Government argued that Valenzuela Gallardo’s conviction of
accessory to a felony constituted an “offense relating to obstruction of justice.”83
Such an offense would also qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(S), 84 and made Valenzuela Gallardo eligible for placement in
removal proceedings.85 A motion to terminate removal proceedings was filed in
July 2010, and Valenzuela Gallardo contested removability.86 He argued that
his conviction of accessory to a felony 87 was not an offense “relating to
unconstitutionally vague in its instant holding that the immigration statute was unconstitutionally
vague).
78. Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 2016).
79. Id.
80. Id. Valenzuela Gallardo had been discovered in a stolen vehicle that contained drugs and
a firearm. Id. The dismissed charges included “two counts of possession of a controlled substance
. . . , one count of possessing methamphetamine while armed . . . , and one count of failing to
comply with the terms of his probation.” Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 811–12.
84. Id. at 812. The statute is also referred to as the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
INA § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2012).
85. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 811–12.
86. Id. at 812.
87. Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 32 (West 1935):
Every person who, after a felony has been committed, harbors, conceals or aids a
principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape from
arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that said principal has
committed such felony or has been charged with such felony or convicted thereof, is an
accessory to such felony.
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obstruction of justice,” since the “federal ‘Obstruction of Justice’ ground must
relate to an” ongoing judicial proceeding.88
The motion to terminate removal proceedings was denied by the immigration
judge overseeing the removal proceedings,89 who determined that a conviction
under the California statute did constitute an “offense relating to obstruction of
justice.” 90 The judge noted that the BIA had not “limited the scope of the
obstruction of justice aggravated felony to cases in which there is a pending
judicial proceeding.” 91 The judge then ordered Valenzuela Gallardo to be
“removed to Mexico.”92 The order was appealed to the BIA, who dismissed it.93
Valenzuela Gallardo then petitioned for review to the federal courts, and
requested a stay of his removal order.94 However, the Ninth Circuit originally
dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction. 95 The Board of Immigration
Appeals reopened Valenzuela Gallardo’s proceedings sua sponte,96 in response
to the Ninth Circuit’s Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder97 decision that created a
new definition for the “obstruction of justice” offense in the immigration
provision at issue. 98 In its further consideration of Valenzuela Gallardo’s
removal order as a result of the Hoang case, the BIA’s three-judge panel created
a new definition for the crime of “obstruction of justice.” 99 In creating the
definition, the BIA determined that an offense for “obstruction of justice” solely
requires:
[T]he affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to
interfere with the process of justice . . . . While many crimes fitting
this definition will involve interference with an ongoing criminal
investigation or trial, we now clarify that the existence of such

Id.
88. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812.
89. Id. (reasoning that the Board of Immigration “had previously held that the federal crime
of accessory after the fact . . . is an aggravated felony.”).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. Despite the fact that the BIA is the highest administrative body for enforcing and
interpreting immigration laws, an individual is allowed to appeal to the Federal District Court if
their petition to the BIA is denied, and their challenge is based on legal or constitutional grounds.
Immigration Law Appeals, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/immigration/appeals/ (last visited Mar.
3, 2019).
95. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812.
96. Id.
97. See Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir 2011) (holding a crime
constitutes an obstruction of justice “when it interferes with an ongoing proceeding or
investigation” where the court considered two prior BIA decisions).
98. See discussion infra Part D.
99. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812 (citing Trung Thanh Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1164).
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proceedings is not an essential element of an “offense relating to
obstruction of justice.”100
Using that definition, the three-judge panel found that the California statue under
which Valenzuela Gallardo was convicted is “properly classified” as an
“obstruction of justice” offense,101 and dismissed the reopened appeal.102
2. Ninth Circuit’s Opinion: Unconstitutionally Vague
Following the denial, Valenzuela Gallardo once again petitioned the Ninth
Circuit for review.103 Finding that there was jurisdiction,104 the court granted
the petition.105 The Ninth Circuit subsequently held that the new construction
of “obstruction of justice” created by the BIA, specifically the phrase “process
of justice,” was unconstitutionally vague.106 In coming to this conclusion, the
Ninth Circuit assessed whether deference was owed to the BIA’s definition,107
and most importantly, whether the definition was in fact unconstitutionally
vague.108
In determining whether deference was owed, the Ninth Circuit concluded,
“where an agency’s interpretation of a statute raises grave constitutional
concerns, and where Congress has not clearly indicated it intends a
constitutionally suspect interpretation, [the Court could] assume Congress did
not delegate authority for the interpretation[.]”109 Given that, the Ninth Circuit
first had to determine whether any grave constitutional concerns arose out of the
BIA’s newest construction of the definition of “obstruction of justice.”110
In analyzing possible vagueness in the new interpretation of “obstruction of
justice,” the Ninth Circuit took particular issue with the phrase “process of
100. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812. See In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec.
838, 841 (B.I.A. 2012).
101. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812; Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I & N. Dec. at 841.
102. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), which provides the circumstances under which the
federal courts can review decisions involving orders of removal).
105. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 825.
106. Id. at 812, 824.
107. Id. at 815 (using the Chevron doctrine, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether deference was
owed to the BIA’s interpretation for “obstruction of justice,” as it is the highest administrative body
for interpreting and applying immigration law). The doctrine itself holds that if there is a binding
agency precedent, courts should generally defer to that precedent as long as two requirements are
met: 1) “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” and the statute does not
“unambiguously bar” an agency’s interpretation, and 2) whether the “BIA’s interpretation is ‘based
on a permissible construction of the statute.’” Id.
108. Id. at 819–22.
109. Id. at 818. In coming to this conclusion, the court applied the constitutional avoidance
and constitutional narrowing doctrines, which in the context of the Chevron doctrine, allowed the
court to refuse to “accord deference to agency interpretations that raise grave constitutional doubts
where other permissible and less troubling interpretations exist.” Id. at 817.
110. Id. at 818–19.
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justice” within the definition. 111 It stated that because the BIA gave no
indication as to what was included within the phrase, or where that process
begins or ends, the new phrase was unconstitutionally vague. 112 The court
analogized the phrase “process of justice” to the residual clause of the Armed
Career Criminal Act in the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision, which was held
unconstitutionally vague.113
Like the residual clause in the Johnson case, which involved a great degree of
uncertainty as to the amount of risk needed to qualify as a violent felony, the
new construction including “process of justice” also left a great amount of
uncertainty regarding what was included within the “process of justice” phrase,
especially if there was no requirement of an ongoing criminal investigation or
trial.114 The uncertainty was exacerbated by the lack of a definition for “process
of justice” in any of the BIA’s prior case law.115
The court found that the uncertainty created by the phrase “process of justice”
left it unable to determine exactly what specific intent crimes qualified,116 noting
that almost any specific intent crime could be included. 117 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit held that the BIA’s new interpretation for “obstruction of justice” was
unconstitutionally vague as a result of its use of the phrase “process of justice,”
and its lack of any additional guidance as to what the phrase includes.118
Finally, since the court determined that the new interpretation created serious
constitutional doubts, it also had to assess whether Congress “made it clear that
it chooses the constitutionally doubtful interpretation.”119 It held that there was
no indication that Congress intended such an interpretation, given that its
examples of obstruction of justice either are connected to an ongoing proceeding
or investigation, or have some additional specificity that provides notice.120 As
111. Id. at 819.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 819. See also discussion supra Part 2.
114. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 819–20. The court also looked to the other obstruction
related crimes listed in the statute that qualified as “aggravated felonies” and found that they both
were tied to ongoing criminal proceedings. Id. at 821.
115. Id. at 820. The court noted that there was no definition of “process of justice” within the
INA’s definition section. Id. It also cited Black’s Law Dictionary to show that there was no
definition for “process of justice” within it. Id.
116. Id. (explaining that “[a]bsent some indication of the contours of ‘process of justice,’ an
unpredictable variety of specific intent crimes could fall within it, leaving us unable to determine
what crimes make a criminal defendant deportable…and what crimes do not.”). The court was also
concerned about the possibility of the new interpretation inviting arbitrary enforcement, which
could result in defense attorneys unable to accurately advise their clients. Id. at 820–21.
117. Id. at 820. The court further noted, “[i]t is difficult to imagine a specific intent crime that
could not be swept into the BIA’s expanded definition.” Id. at 822.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 823.
120. Id. The court also explained that catchall provisions in a federal criminal obstruction of
justice provision have been construed by courts as requiring a connection to an ongoing criminal
proceeding or trial:
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a result, the Ninth Circuit did not defer to the BIA’s interpretation, and remanded
the appeal to the BIA, instructing it to offer a new construction to the definition
of “obstruction of justice,” or alternatively, apply a previously used
interpretation that complied with the constitutional requirements for due
process.121
D. The BIA’s Past Constructions of “Obstruction of Justice”
One of the earliest constructions of “obstruction of justice” referenced by the
Ninth Circuit in Valenzuela Gallardo122 is the one found in the BIA’s decision
in In re Batista-Hernandez.123 In determining whether the federal offense of
accessory after the fact fell under the umbrella of “obstruction of justice” crimes,
as outlined in § 1101(a)(43)(S),124 the BIA had only a cursory discussion.125 It
concluded that the offense qualified as “obstruction of justice,” and in turn an
aggravated felony, because the statute “criminalizes actions knowingly taken to
‘hinder or prevent [another’s] apprehension, trial, or punishment.’”126
Two years later, the BIA released a differing, and more descriptive,
construction for “obstruction of justice” in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez.127 In that
case, Espinoza-Gonzalez was a citizen of Mexico, who had gained legal resident
status in the United States.128 He was convicted of the offense of misprision of
a felony, which was categorized as an offense constituting “obstruction of
justice.” 129 Espinoza-Gonzalez was placed in removal proceedings. 130 The
immigration judge presiding over the case found that the offense that EspinozaGonzalez was convicted of did not constitute an “obstruction of justice”
offense. 131 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed the
Recent decisions of Courts of Appeals have likewise tended to place metes and bounds
on the very broad language of the catchall provision. The action taken by the accused
must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings…if the defendant
lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the
requisite intent to obstruct.
Id. (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995)).
121. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 824.
122. Id. at 813.
123. See In re Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (B.I.A. 1997) (noting that “the wording
in 18 U.S.C. § 3 itself indicates its relation to obstruction of justice” and discussing “the nature of
being an accessory after the fact”).
124. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 813.
125. Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 961. The other explanation for its holding was “the
nature of being an accessory after the fact lies essentially in obstructing justice and preventing the
arrest of the offender.” Id. at 962.
126. Id. at 962 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1993)).
127. See In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889 (B.I.A. 1999).
128. Id. at 890.
129. Id. at 889–90 (stating the statute under which he was convicted is 18 U.S.C.S. § 4).
130. Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 890.
131. Id. at 892 (explaining that the immigration judge found that the statutory language for
misprision of a felony did not directly relate to obstruction of justice).
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decision to the BIA. 132 Despite INS’s arguments, the BIA agreed with the
immigration judge.133
In reaching that conclusion, the BIA looked to “obstruction of justice”
offenses in the federal criminal statutes.134 It explained that those “obstruction
of justice” offenses “have as an element interference with the proceedings of a
tribunal or require an intent to harm or retaliate against others who cooperate in
the process of justice or might otherwise so cooperate.”135 The BIA also noted
“[i]t is a lesser offense to conceal a crime where there is no investigation or
proceeding.”136 Additionally, it specifically mentioned that the Supreme Court
narrowly construes a catchall provision found in the federal “obstruction of
justice” statutes.137 The BIA specifically quoted the Supreme Court:
The action taken by the accused must be with an intent to influence
judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an
intent to influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation
independent of the Court’s or grand jury’s authority . . . . In other
words, the endeavor must have the “natural and probable effect” of
interfering with the due administration of justice . . . . If the defendant
lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial
proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct.138
Using those federal statutes, the BIA thus held that the offense at issue in
Espinoza-Gonzalez, having none of the limiting elements (i.e., interference in an
ongoing investigation or proceeding), did not rise to the necessary level to
warrant it being classified as an “obstruction of justice” crime.139
It was to this narrower construction that the Ninth Circuit had previously
deferred to on three separate occasions.140 The most recent case illustrating this

132. Id. at 889.
133. Id. at 892 (finding that “the elements of the offense of misprision of a felony do not
constitute the crime of obstruction of justice as that term is defined in the United States Code.”).
134. Id.
135. Id. (noting the court specifically looked at the obstruction of justice offenses listed in 18
U.S.C. §§ 1501–1518).
136. Id. at 895.
137. Id. at 892. The BIA quoted from a Supreme Court case discussing the catchall provision
that prohibited a “person who ‘corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or
communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede,
the due administration of justice’” found in 18 U.S.C. § 1503. Id.
138. Id. (citing United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598–99 (1995) (making false statements
to an investigating agent who would potentially testify at a grand jury proceeding was not sufficient
to constitute an obstruction of justice crime)).
139. Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 896.
140. See Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011); Salazar-Luviano
v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 2008) (deferring to the Espinoza-Gonzalez construction
of “obstruction of justice” when determining if aiding and abetting the attempted escape from
custody constitutes an aggravated felony); Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076, 1086–87
(9th Cir. 2008) (using the Espinoza-Gonzalez definition of “obstruction of justice” to conclude that
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deference by the court was its decision in Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder,141
where a Vietnamese citizen and permanent resident of the United States was
convicted of rendering criminal assistance in the second degree. 142 In its
reasoning, the Ninth Circuit referenced back to one of their prior decisions
stating, “Espinoza-Gonzalez ‘articulated both an actus reus and mens rea
element of the generic definition of [obstruction of justice] crimes for purposes
of § 1101(a)(43)(S).’”143
Since it determined the construction of “obstruction of justice” in EspinozaGonzalez, was reasonable,144 the court used those elements to determine that the
conviction lacked the “necessary actus reus” and therefore did not constitute
“obstruction of justice.”145 It is with these prior constructions in mind that the
Ninth Circuit disapproved of the BIA’s most recent definition of “obstruction of
justice” in its In re Valenzuela Gallardo decision.146
II. WHICH IS BEST? COMPETING CONSTRUCTIONS FOR OBSTRUCTION OF
JUSTICE
A. Comparing the Narrow and Broad Approaches to “Obstruction of Justice”
As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, it appears that the newest construction of
“obstruction of justice” created by the BIA in In re Valenzuela-Gallardo departs
from its prior interpretations.147 The constructions can generally be categorized
into two approaches: a narrower construction, as seen in the most recent
decision, and a broader construction, to which the court has deferred to on
several occasions.148

a failure to appear in court in violation of federal criminal provision qualified as an obstruction of
justice).
141. Trung Thanh Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1161 (stating “[i]n light of our precedent, we look to
Espinoza-Gonzalez to supply the definition of the generic federal obstruction of justice offense.”).
142. Id. at 1159.
143. Id. at 1161. See also Renteria-Morales, 551 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Espinoza-Gonzalez,
22 I. & N. Dec. at 893) (discussing actus reus as “either active interference with proceedings of a
tribunal or investigation, or action or threat of action against those who would cooperate in the
process of justice”)). Furthermore, it described mens rea as “specific intent to interfere with the
process of justice.” Renteria-Morales, 551 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N.
Dec. at 893).
144. Trung Thanh Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1161. The Court also determined that it did not need to
defer to the BIA’s conclusion that a particular crime is removable offense, only to its definitions of
ambiguous terms. Id. at 1163. Additionally, it pointed out that if the BIA is dealing with the
interpretation of a state criminal statute, since it is not a matter “committed to the BIA’s
expertise[,]” the court owed “no deference to the BIA’s resolution of [that] question.” Id.
145. Id. at 1165.
146. Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 813–14, 816 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016).
147. Id. at 813 (stating “[t]he BIA’s most recent interpretation departs from its prior
interpretations.”).
148. Id. at 814; see discussion infra Part A.1.

748

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 68:733

1. Espinoza-Gonzalez: Broad “Obstruction” Construction
The older construction created by the BIA in its Espinoza-Gonzalez decision
is more expansive and detailed than the subsequent definition of “obstruction of
justice.”149 The elements included in the definition were an actus reus, active
interference with proceedings, and mens rea, specific intent to interfere with the
process of justice, 150 providing more clarity than the preceding construction
given in Batista-Hernandez.151 By explicitly stating that an offense constitutes
obstruction of justice if there is specific intent to interfere with the process of
justice and there must be active interference with criminal proceedings, the
construction gives constitutional due process notice to an individual as to what
crimes would fall into this category.152
2. In re Valenzuela-Gallardo: Narrow “Obstruction” Construction
Despite the prior construction passing constitutional muster, the BIA changed
the construction of “obstruction of justice” in the In re Valenzuela-Gallardo
decision. 153 It eliminated completely the actus reus element as delineated
previously.154 This meant that any specific intent crime that interfered with the
“process of justice” would fall under that category. 155 However, without
defining what “process of justice” entails, and without any further actus reus, the
construction is unconstitutionally vague, and fails due process requirements, as
it creates an issue of lack of fair notice, and the potential for arbitrary
enforcement.156
Without the actus reus qualification, any reasonable person would have to
guess as to which of his specific intent actions did interfere with the “process of
justice,” which goes against the very basic tenants of the constitutional void-forvagueness doctrine. 157 Furthermore, the lack of definition for “process of
149. Id. at 824 (referencing the construction found in Espinoza-Gonzalez as the broader
definition in relation to the newer “obstruction of justice” definition).
150. Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076, 1086 (2016).
151. See generally In re Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (B.I.A. 1997) (determining
that a conviction of a controlled substance does not establish deportability).
152. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 732 (2000)).
153. In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 838, 841 (B.I.A. 2012).
154. Id. (clarifying that there is no requirement for the existence of an ongoing criminal
proceeding in “obstruction of justice” offenses).
155. Id.
156. Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 819 (9th Cir. 2016). As pointed out by the
Ninth Circuit, when the Government made the unsatisfying argument that the specific intent
requirement narrowed the scope of the definition, the crucial question of “specific intent to do
what?” was still left open. Id. at 821. Furthermore, it explained that despite the fact that the statute
defined what intent (“mens rea”) was needed, it provided “little instruction on the equally important
actus reus.” Id.
157. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (noting “the void-for-vagueness doctrine
requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
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justice” means that the determination of what falls within that broad category is
left wholly to the discretion of the court. This results in arbitrary enforcement,
as one court may feel that a crime qualifies, while another disagrees.
B. Susceptibility to Due Process Concerns: Immigrants and Immigration Law
The field of immigration law has been compared to a game of “roulette,”158
and described as an area where “the normal rules of constitutional law simply
do not apply.”159 As a result, immigration laws culminate in the individuals it
affects being especially at risk of the problems that underlie the void-forvagueness doctrine: lack of notice and arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.160 The punishments for non-citizens, namely deportation and bar
to entry, are extremely severe,161 so the fact that many of these constitutional
safeguards are seemingly weaker in this area should elicit grave concerns all the
more.
1. Lack of Fair Notice
The first concern is that of constitutional notice, and whether a reasonable
person would understand what conduct conforms to the law, and what does
not. 162 As such, statutes are supposed to be unambiguous. 163 Even then,
individuals that are put on trial are still guaranteed an attorney, if they so desire

people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.”).
158. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 301–02 (2007) (explaining that the
discretion that immigration judges have in immigration law proceedings, specifically in asylum
cases, are akin to a game of roulette). “Bewildering,” “labyrinthine,” and “nebulous” are other
similar terms that have been used to describe immigration laws. Koh, supra note 7, at 1128; see
also Derrick Moore, “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude”: Why the Void for Vagueness Argument
is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 813, 814 (2008). It is difficult to imagine
expecting individuals typically unfamiliar with the language, culture, and legal system of the United
States to grasp the intricacies of a complex field of law that eludes even those trained in its practice.
159. Koh, supra note 7, at
1153 (quoting STEPHEN
H. LEGOMSKY &
CRISTINA
RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 113 (5th ed. 2009)).
160. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (noting a statute does not comply
with due process if a person of ordinary intelligence does not have fair notice of what is prohibited,
which leads to discriminatory enforcement).
161. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (stating “deportation is a drastic measure
and at times the equivalent of banishment of exile . . . . It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a
residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty . . . . [T]he stakes are considerable for the
individual”). See also Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (stating the Court would
analyze the application of the vagueness doctrine to a case involving an immigration provision due
to “the grave nature of deportation”).
162. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (discussing that when there is no
constitutional notice of illegal conduct, laws can be vague and “offend several important values”).
163. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
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one, to help them in navigating the complexities of the criminal proceedings.164
However, when it comes to non-citizens, not only must they know what conduct
violates criminal law, they must also know what criminal offenses trigger
immigration sanctions.165 Thus, an added level of knowledge of the legal system
is expected of individuals who may not have a grasp of the language, much less
the legal system. Additionally, there is absolutely no right to court-appointed
counsel in removal proceedings,166 meaning that non-citizens who cannot afford
their own representation are forced to enter the immigration minefield alone.
These factors demonstrate, in part, the disadvantage challenging individuals who
face, or are in the midst of, removal proceedings, and the necessity of having
immigration provisions statutes that provide notice as to what offenses can
trigger removal proceedings.167
2. Substantial Arbitrary Enforcement
Another especially problematic area in immigration proceedings is that of
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.168 Immigration judges, as well as the
officials that bring forth charges and initiate removal proceedings, are granted a
vast amount of discretion. 169 Highlighting precisely that arbitrariness in
immigration proceedings, Justice Kagan commented: “[a]n alien appearing
before one official may suffer deportation; an identically situated alien appearing
before another may gain the right to stay in the country.” 170 Ensuring that
immigration provisions are as straightforward as possible would help in
constraining the risk of arbitrary enforcement that is prevalent in the field today.
Given these additional concerns, that are generally non-existent with other

164. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .
. . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
165. Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical
Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1669, 1682–85 (2011) (describing the connection
between a criminal conviction and initiations of immigration sanctions, including removal
proceedings).
166. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012) (stating “[i]n any removal proceeding before an immigration judge
. . . the person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the
Government) by such counsel”).
167. Koh, supra note 7, at 1154–59 (discussing the “exceptional need for notice in the
immigration context,” and providing other factors that further play into the need for a “strong
vagueness analysis”).
168. Id. at 1160 (commenting that “[e]xtraordinary levels of arbitrariness [exists] when it
comes to discretionary decision-making in immigration cases”); see also Jason A. Cade, Judging
Immigration Equity: Deportation and Proportionality in the Supreme Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1029, 1071–75 (2017).
169. Koh, supra note 7, at 1160–62, 1164–65 (assessing the discretion that ICE prosecutors,
officers and the immigration judges have in determining charges to be brought, and the decisions
to be reached).
170. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 58, 64 (2011) (finding that a BIA policy violated the
Administrative Procedures Act due to it being an “arbitrary and capricious” restriction on eligibility
for relief from removal).
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statutory provisions, non-citizens are disadvantaged in their due process rights
in removal proceedings.171 Thus, it is crucial to apply the vagueness doctrine to
immigration provisions to ensure compliance.
C. Increase in Immigration Arrests and Deportation Heightens Risk of
Possible Constitutional Violations in Removal Proceedings
With the prevalence of constitutional concerns in immigration removal
proceedings, the recent increase in arrests of non-citizens, and their deportations,
over the past two administrations172 means that even more individuals will be
affected by such an issue. In 2017 alone, more than 211,000 immigrants had
been deported,173 all of which would have been subjected to removal proceeding
prior to deportation. Specifically, between January 22 and September 2,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested more than 28,000
individuals.174 These arrests will eventually result in removal proceedings.175
These numbers only indicate that a great many individuals will continue to be
subjected to proceedings that are tainted by violations of their due process rights.
It is imperative that any immigration provision be subjected to a critical analysis
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, along with any other doctrine that
protects such constitutional rights. By ensuring that immigration provisions
abide by the requirement of notice and protection against arbitrary enforcement,
the proceedings will not be marred by unconstitutional vagueness concerns.176

171. Das, supra note 165, at 1728 (stating that immigration adjudications do not operate on a
level playing field between the parties).
172. Nick Miroff, Deportations Fall under President Trump Despite Increase in Arrests by
ICE, CHI. TRIB., (Sept. 28, 2017, 8:28 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/cttrump-deportations-20170928-story.html.
173. Id.
174. Id. That increase is approximately three times higher than the number of immigrants
arrested over the same time period in 2016. See also Ted Hesson, Trump Deportations Lag behind
Obama
Levels,
POLITICO
(Aug.
8,
2017,
8:35
PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/08/trump-deportations-behind-obama-levels-241420
(explaining that although deportations have lagged, arrest rates and removal orders have increased).
175. Caitlin Dickerson, Immigration Arrests Rise Sharply as a Trump Mandate is Carried out,
N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/us/immigration-enforcementice-arrests.html. The article also notes that due to a backlog of immigration cases, many of the
arrests had not yet triggered removal proceedings. Id. However, when they do undergo the
proceedings, the possible violations of due process as a result of vague immigration provisions will
still lurk. Id. Furthermore, the arrests themselves can result in detentions while the detainees await
their hearings. Das, supra note 165, at 1685. In the meantime, the government has the ability to
transfer the individuals to any number of facilities across the country, which may separate them
from desperately needed legal counsel or records, further exacerbating due process concerns. Id.
at 1728.
176. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (stating that the doctrine of voidfor-vagueness is “a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play
and settled rules of law” and that a statute which violates the doctrine “violates the first essential of
due process”).
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D. Examining Obstruction of Justice Outside the Immigration Realm
Finally, it is beneficial to look to criminal statutes that involve obstruction of
justice charges outside of the immigration realm. These statutes could help
inform the construction of the BIA’s definition of its own obstruction of justice
statute. It would also aid in determining which of the BIA’s previous definitions
are more closely in line with obstruction of justice statutes from another area of
law.
The United States Code has an entire chapter on obstruction of justice
charges. 177 An overview of the chapter shows there are many kinds of
obstruction of justice offenses, each having related to a certain kind of crime.178
One such obstruction statute is for obstruction of court orders, which states:
Whoever, by threats or force, willfully prevents, obstructs, impedes,
or interferes with, or willfully attempts to prevent, obstruct, impede,
or interfere with, the due exercise of rights or the performance of
duties under any order, judgment, or decree of a court of the United
States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.179
By ensuring the statute specifically outlines what aspects of “justice” would
need to be obstructed in order to be a crime, the United States Code has no issue
of vagueness, or fair notice, and it does not allow for the possibility of arbitrary
enforcement. A reasonable person reading the statute would understand what
actions would thus be in violation of the law. This type of specificity should be
sought in the BIA’s construction of “obstruction of justice.”
III. THE TEMPORAL NEXUS REQUIREMENT CLARIFIES VAGUENESS
This part offers up the “temporal nexus” requirement as an addition to the
construction of “obstruction of justice” that could potentially alleviate the
concerns of notice and arbitrary enforcement that are addressed by the void-forvagueness doctrine. Despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit declined to hold that
a temporal nexus requirement was necessary in the BIA’s In re Valenzuela
Gallardo construction of “obstruction of justice,”180 such a requirement would
resolve the unconstitutional vagueness issue.

177. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2012).
178. See id. For example, § 1509 specifically relates to obstruction of a court order, while §
1506 criminalizes theft or alteration of record of process, as well as false bail. Id. §§ 1506, 1509.
These specified offenses lend credence to the argument that an obstruction of justice definition
should be narrow, as opposed to broad.
179. Id. § 1509.
180. Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 822 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting “[t]he dissent
reads our opinion as imposing a ‘temporal nexus requirement’ on the BIA’s definition of ‘crimes
relating to obstruction of justice’ . . . . It doesn’t. We do not hold that the BIA’s definition of
‘obstruction of justice’ must be tied to an ongoing proceeding.”).
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A temporal nexus in this context would mean that, as in the EspinozaGonzalez construction,181 an ongoing criminal trial or investigation would need
to be taking place for the crime to constitute an “obstruction of justice” offense.
Such a requirement would result in more context for the amorphous “process of
justice,” resolving many of the issues that the Ninth Circuit had.182 Take for
example, the federal crime of misprision of felony, which states:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as
soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person
in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.183
With a brief reading of the offense, a reasonable person would know that the
crime of misprision of felony would not qualify as an “obstruction of justice”
offense, if using the Espinoza-Gonzalez construction.184 The analysis of the
actus reus element of interference with proceedings is simple; it is automatically
not met because there is no requirement in the statute that the concealment of
the felony be during an ongoing proceeding.185 The specific intent to interfere
is met by the requirement of having knowledge of the felony and concealing it
anyway.
Thus, the notice requirement of the void-for-vagueness analysis is easily met.
The addition of a temporal nexus provides crucial protection against arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement, which non-citizens are particularly susceptible
to,186 because by requiring specific elements to be met, the determinations of the
court will not have room for arbitrary variation in its holdings. A construction
similar to this, as a result of meeting both the requirements of the Due Process
Clause, would have no issue passing the two-step void-for-vagueness analysis.
In contrast, when applying the narrow “obstruction of justice” construction to
the same misprision of felony offenses, the vagueness issues are stark. The
elimination of a temporal nexus to ongoing proceedings results in a lack of
context for the phrase “process of justice.”187 One judge could determine that
the “process of justice” begins as soon as the individual convicted of misprision

181. In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889, 896 (B.I.A. 1999).
182. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 820 (stating the construction including “process of
justice” did not provide sufficient enough standards that would enable a reasonable person to
understand what offenses would be categorized as such).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
184. Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 892 (finding the BIA also concluded in its
Espinoza-Gonzalez decision that such an offense did not qualify as “obstruction of justice,” using
their very own construction of the phrase).
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 4.
186. See discussion supra Part B.
187. Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 838, 841 (noting the only requirement as outlined
by the BIA was just the specific intent to interfere with “process of justice”).
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of felony188 gained the knowledge of the actual commission of the knowledge.
However, another judge could decide that the “process of justice” comes in to
effect when police are called to the scene of the felony.189 The Supreme Court
had similar concerns in its Johnson and Dimaya decisions, describing a scenario
in which judges have different ideas as to what an “ordinary case” of attempted
burglary looks like.190 A higher risk of arbitrary enforcement would be likely to
abound. Furthermore, if a well learned judicial official would have such
different opinions as to the meaning of “process of justice,” it seems illogical to
expect surety from foreigners of both this country and legal system.
The temporal nexus would also satisfy the other concerns brought forth by the
Supreme Court in its most recent decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, addressing a
void-for-vagueness challenge to a statute. 191
The uncertainty and
“indeterminacy” that arose in the statute ultimately caused the Court to hold that
it was unconstitutionally vague. 192 The addition of a temporal nexus to the
“obstruction of justice” construction would result in no such uncertainty, it
would clarify what an “ordinary case” would look like, and it would create the
requirement that the crime be committed in connection to an ongoing
proceeding. 193 Finally, by including a temporal nexus, the definition of
188. 18 U.S.C. § 4.
189. See Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2011) (reasoning
that yet another could hold that it wasn’t until the arrest of the individual who committed the felony
that the “process of justice” begins). The possibilities for such disparate determinations are
numerous, and it is this very possibility of varying holdings from the judges that goes against the
very nature of the Due Process Clause. The Ninth Circuit in its Trung Thanh Hoang decision made
a similar argument about the broadness of a different criminal offense, stating:
A defendant could be convicted of rendering criminal assistance . . . if he provided
transportation to an individual he knows is subject to a pending investigation or
proceeding—but he could also be convicted if he provides transportation to an individual
he knows has committed a crime, before any investigation or judicial proceeding has
begun. The state statute of conviction is divisible . . . . Because [the statute] does not
require the necessary actus reus, a violation of that statute is not categorically obstruction
of justice.
Id.
190. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1214 (2018) (reasoning “one judge, contemplating
the ‘ordinary case,’ would imagine the ‘violent encounter’ apt to ensue when a ‘would-be burglar
[was] spotted by a police officer [or] private security guard’ . . . . Another judge would conclude
that ‘any confrontation’ was more ‘likely to consist of [an observer’s] yelling “Who’s there?” . . .
and the burglar’s running away’”).
191. Id. at 1216 (holding that a residual clause of an immigration statute should be struck down
for being unconstitutionally vague by “unpredictability” and “arbitrariness”).
192. Id. at 1223. See also Koh, supra note 7, at 1149 (explaining “the Court found that the
residual clause reached a level of ‘indeterminacy’ that was not tolerable from a vagueness
perspective.”).
193. This was also a concern that was noted by the Ninth Circuit. See Valenzuela Gallardo v.
Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 820 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating “[t]he BIA’s new construction leaves grave
uncertainty about the plethora of steps and after an ‘ongoing criminal investigation or trial’ that
comprise ‘the process of justice,’ and hence, uncertainty about which crimes constitute ‘obstruction
of justice.’”).
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“obstruction of justice” would be more akin to the obstruction of justice crimes
that are found in the United States Code, which have no issue with due process
comportment.194
IV. CONCLUSION
Immigrants have flocked to America’s shores for centuries and will continue
to do so for years to come. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Due
Process protections that are at the very heart of our Constitution apply to those
immigrants, as well as citizens. In the immigration system today, which can
have such drastic consequences on the lives of individuals and their families, it
is imperative that protections are applied. Notice and arbitrary enforcement
concerns permeate immigration removal proceedings and using the vagueness
doctrine to rework unconstitutional immigration provisions would be a crucial
step in applying Due Process protections to everyone. Adding a temporal nexus
to the BIA’s construction of “obstruction of justice” would be another measure
that would aid such an endeavor.

194. See discussion supra Part D.
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